This paper considers sequencing situations with due date criteria. Three di erent t ypes of criteria are considered: the weighted penalty criterion, the weighted tardiness criterion and the completion time criterion. The main focus is on convexity of the associated cooperative games.
Introduction
In one-machine sequencing situations a number of jobs has to be processed on a single machine. We assume that associated to each job there is an agent player who has a speci c cost function which among other things depends on the completion time of his job. Further, there is assumed to be an initial order on the jobs of the agents before the processing of the machine starts. The objective is to nd a processing order of the jobs that minimizes the aggregate cost function of all players.
Once this order has been obtained, a new question arises: how to allocate the corresponding cost savings with respect to the initial order among the agents? Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs 1989 analyzed this problem by considering corresponding cooperative sequencing games for the special class of sequencing situations in which all players use a weighted completion time criterion. It was shown that all sequencing games of this type are convex games, so that allocation rules which always result in outcomes that are stable against coalitional deviations core elements can be devised. The EGS-rule, which is based on an allocation procedure that follows the algorithm to go from the initial order to an optimal one, was proposed as a particular choice of such a rule.
In Curiel, Potters, Rajendra P r asad, Tijs, and Veltman 1993 a more general class of sequencing situations is considered. For each agent, the cost Our aim is to analyze the convexity property for each of the three corresponding classes of cooperative games. The convexity condition expresses that the incentives of an arbitrary agent for joining a certain coalition increase as the coalition grows. In the context of cooperative games, the property of convexity has drawn the interest of several researchers. The class of convex TU games has several nice properties. Shapley 1971 and Ichiischi 1981 showed that the extreme points of the core are the marginal vectors of the game if and only if the game is convex. Hence, convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, with respect to one-point game theoretical solution concepts, it holds that the Shapley value Shapley 1953, which i s b y de nition the average of the marginal vectors, is the barycenter of the core. Besides, the convexity property has been also extended and applied to the class of NTU games Vilkov 1977 and Sharkey 1982 and to the class of stochastic cooperative games Suijs and Borm 1999. It turns out that convexity is not satis ed in general for the classes of games we deal with. It depends on the di erent parameters of the model: the processing times, the due dates, and the exact penalties for being late. We will show which classes of parameters do and do not necessary lead to convexity.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the underlying sequencing model and provide a characterization of the property of convexity for the class of 0 -component additive games. In section 3 and 4, we analyze this property for the class of sequencing games that arise from sequencing situations where the aggregate cost function is based on weighted penalty criteria and weighted tardiness criteria, respectively. In each of these sections, we rst describe a procedure that leads to an optimal order. Several examples illustrate that not all games associated to these sequencing situations are convex. Nevertheless, convexity holds by xing some parameters in the model. In section 5, we show that sequencing situations in which all jobs have equal processing times, the due date of each job is a multiple of its processing time and the cost of each job is given by the weighted completion time function, yield the same class of convex games as the sequencing situations in which all jobs have equal processing times, the ready time of each job is a multiple of its processing time and the cost of each job is determined by a w eighted completion time criterion, i.e., the class considered by Hamers, Borm, and Tijs 1995. C3 weighted completion time" c 3 i t = i t where i 0. The cost for job i is proportional to its completion time. There is, however, one obvious restriction here. It is assumed that we only consider orders in which all jobs are on time.
If the jobs are arranged by an order 2 N; let t ;i be the starting time of job i; i.e., t ;i = P k2N: k i p k and let C ; S be the time moment that all jobs in S are completed if the order is given by ; i.e., C ; S = P k2N: k m p k where m 2 S is the last player in S according to the order given by ; i.e., m k forall k 2 S: With minor abuse of notation we will write C ; i instead of C ; fig : Let c S be the aggregate cost of S in the order 1 Formally, 0 is a bijection from N to f1; : : : ; n g where 0 i = s means that job i is in position s in the queue before the machine. We will denote the class of all these bijections by N. 2 Given t 2 I R, w e will denote t + = maxft;0g : 3 given by ; c S = P i2S c i C ; i : The maximal cost savings of a coalition S depend on the set of admissible rearrangements of this coalition. We call a bijection : N ! f 1; :::; ng admissible for S if it satis es P ; i = P 0 ; i for all i 2 NnS, where P ; i = fj 2 N j j ig: Hence, we consider an order to be admissible for S if each agent outside S has the same starting time as in the initial order. Moreover, the agents of S are not allowed to jump over players outside S. The set of all admissible rearrangements for a coalition S is denoted by S .
Given a d,sequencing situation N; 0 ; d ; p ; the corresponding sequencing game is de ned in such a w ay that the worth of a coalition S is equal to the maximalcost savings the coalition can achieve b y means of admissible rearrangements. Formally, w e h a ve vS=max 2S fc 0 S , c Sg = c 0 S , c^ S where^ 2 S is an optimal order for the coalition S. Remark. Notice we can write the coe cients in two w ays: g k;l = v k;l , v k;l , vk;l , vk;l = v k;l , vk;l , v k;l , vk;l : The rst expression can be interpreted as follows: the rst part, v k;l , v k;l; measures the contribution of player l the last player of the coalition k;l if he joins to the end of the ordered coalition k;l; and the second part, vk;l , vk;l measures the contribution of player l if he joins to the end of the ordered coalition k;l: So, the di erence speci es the role of player k to the marginal contribution of player l: The second expression can be interpreted in a similar way.
The next theorem is a direct consequence of the results above.
Theorem 2 Let N;v be a 0 ,component additive game. Then N;v is convex if and only if the coe cients g k;l 0 are non negative for all k;l 2 N such that 0 k 0 l. The next sections are devoted to the study of the convexity of the sequencing games arising from d,sequencing situations. As a consequence of theorem 2, in order to check whether a 0 ,component additive game is convex, it su ces to check the non-negativity of all the coe cients g k;l 0 . This fact implies a signi cant reduction in the number of conditions that need to be checked for the convexity of these games. We h a ve t o v erify 1 4. d i = 500 for all i 2 N, 5. i = 1 for all i 2 N. Easy calculations shows that g 1;4 = v 1; 4 , v1; 4 , v 1; 4 + v1; 4 = 1 , 1 , 1 + 0 = ,1 0: Hence, the corresponding game is not convex.
itbpFU3.1047in2.3341in0inOptimal orders w.r.t. C1posterin.wmf The C1,sequencing situation of example 1 illustrates the fact that the associated cooperative games to C1,sequencing situations with equal unitary penalties or equal due dates, in general, need not be convex. If we consider C1,sequencing situations where all jobs having equal processing times, the associated sequencing game will be convex. In order to prove this result we only need to check the non-negativity of the coe cients g k;l 0 for every connected coalition k;l 0 . W e will use the Lawler's algorithm Lawler 1976 to nd an optimal order of every connected coalition w.r.t. the initial order in the associated sequencing game, and then we easily can compute the marginal contributions of each player who joins to the end of the connected coalition. Moreover, a m;j 0 will be the di erence between the corresponding cost of an optimal order of m; j 0 and the associated cost of an optimal order of m; j 0 .
For simplifying the notation, if 0 is the identity permutation, we will denote V 1;j 0 = V j ; G 1;j 0 = G j ; and a 1;j 0 = a j . V j will be called a j , optimal set 4 . In example 1, V 4 = f4; 2g; G 4 = f3; 1g and a 4 = 0 : Lawler 1976 gave a n On logn algorithm to nd an n , optimal set to minimize the weighted number of tardy jobs under one additional assumption w.l.o.g. we will assume that 0 is the identity permutation: Given i,j2 N suchthatp i p j ; then i j : This means that if a job has a shorter processing time than another, its penalty is at least equal or larger. This condition is trivially satis ed if all the processing times are equal. Note that the nal n,optimal set b V n has been achieved by non-negative switches only, b a j 0 for all j 2 f 1; 2; :::; ng.
We h a ve just described how to obtain an n , optimal set. Of course with obvious modi cations this procedure can be applied to obtain an optimal order of the coalition m; j with m l .
The following lemma shows that given a C1,sequencing situation where all processing times equal q; it can be established a relation between the set b V k;l ;
and the set b
Lemma 3 See the appendix.
Example 2. This example shows that to have 2, 3, and 4 we really have to restrict to equal processing times. In example 1, it is easy to check that Taking into account the result of theorem 2, it su ces to prove that g k;l 0 0 for all k;l 2 N such that 0 k 0 l: And, this is derived from lemma 3, since g k;l 0 = b a k;l 0 , b a k;l 0 :
In the next table we summarize the convexity results for sequencing games arising from C1-sequencing situations. From examples 3 and 4, one can derive that in order to guarantee the convexity of the associated sequencing game to a C2,sequencing situation, it is not enough to consider jobs with either the same due dates or the same penalties for their tardiness. Nevertheless, convexity appears when all jobs have both equal penalties for their tardiness and equal processing times, or both equal due dates and equal processing times, or both equal due dates and equal penalties for their tardiness.
In the rst case, the associated sequencing game is a zero game, since all jobs are arranged in a non-decreasing way of their due dates in both the initial and an optimal order Smith 1956. In order to study the two remaining cases, we proceed in the following way: rst we state the gains attainable for player i and j in case player i is directly in front o f p l a yer j ; then, we establish a result that gives us a way to nd an optimal order; and, nally, w e prove the convexity results. See the appendix. Next we describe an optimal order for a C2-sequencing situation when all players have both equal due dates and equal processing times, or both equal due dates and equal penalties for their tardiness. This result is directly derived from lemma 5. we can suppose that p i1 p i2 ::: p in . Let^ 1 = s and^ n = t, where s; t 2 f 1; 2; :::; ng and s 6 = t: Two cases may be considered: 1. t s : That means that player n is coming behind player 1 in the optimal order^ . Then, as a consequence of lemma 6, player 1 switches positions with other players in 1; n u n til he attains position s. As a direct consequence of lemma 5, v 1,n -v1,n =v 1,n-v1,n. 2. t s . In this case, player n is coming ahead player 1 in the optimal order^ . Then, applying lemma 6, player 1 reaches position s in^ by switches with players i 1 ; : : : ; i s,1 2 1; n . Using lemma 5, the marginal contribution of playe r 1 t o 1 ; n is given by v 1,n -v1,n = Easily, expressions 9 and 10 can be compared: all the terms in both expressions are non-negative; each one of the t , 1 initial terms coincides in both expressions; and for each k = t + 2 ; :::; s k,2 P l=1 p il k,2 P l=1 p il , p it : Therefore, v 1; n , v1; n v 1; n , v1; n :
Hence, we conclude that the associated game is convex. In this section we discussed the convexity property of the games arising from C2,sequencing situations according to the di erent parameters of the model. Nevertheless, one case is still unsolved. When all jobs have equal processing times, Slikker1993 proved that if the job number is less or equal than 4; the game is convex. But, in case of a larger number of jobs, the convexity problem is still open.
In the next table we summarize the convexity results for sequencing games arising from C2-sequencing situations. imply that in the initial bijection there is no time gap in the job processing and that in particular the last job that is processed according to 0 is completed at time n. In spite of the conclusion that assumption A3 is super uous, we have added it here for the sake o f c o n venience and symmetry with ready time sequencing situations discussed later on. Moreover, the cost function of each job is proportional to its completion time. A4 c 3 i t = i t; for all i 2 N:
These d,sequencing situations will be called C3,sequencing situations.
Since each job has to be completed before its due date, we will consider for each coalition S only those orders 2 P S such that satisfy C ; i d i . Note that by the assumptions on the initial and admissible bijections we h a ve for any 2 S that i = C ; i for all i 2 N.
Next, we describe the special class of one-machine sequencing situations, in which all jobs have equal processing times and the ready time of each job is a multiple of the processing time and the corresponding class of games. The description of these sequencing games is identical to the d,sequencing situations. The only di erence is that there is no due date imposed on a agent but a ready time. The ready time r i of the job of agent i is the earliest time that the job can be processed on the machine. We will concentrate on sequencing situations that satisfy B1 r i 2 f 0; :::; n,1g and p i = 1 for all i 2 N:The initial order 0 has the properties B2 r i r j for all i; j 2 N with 0 i 0 j and C 0 ; i r i + 1 for all i 2 N and B3 0 i = C 0 ; i for all i 2 N: Note that the assumptions B1 ,B3 imply that in the initial bijection 0 there are no time gaps in the job processing and that the job that is processed last is completed at time n. The cost for agent i is given by A4. A sequencing situation as described above is denoted by N; 0 ; r ; p ; and will be refered to as an r-sequencing situation.
In r-sequencing situations we will only consider those bijections : N ! f1; :::; ng that satisfy C ; i r i + 1 for all i 2 N. The set of admissible rearrangements, denoted by A S , has the same restrictions with respect to interchanging positions between players of a coalition S as before. Hence, we m a y again conclude that for any 2 A S we h a ve that i = C ; i . The corresponding sequencing game is de ned by vS=max 2AS f P i2S i C 0 ; i , 14 P i2S i C ; i g Hamers, Borm and Tijs 1995 show that sequencing games arising from r-sequencing situations are convex by establishing relations between optimal orders of subcoalitions. These relations are obtained by analyzing the procedure described in Rinnooy Kan 1976 that provides an optimal order. For the optimal order in d-sequencing situations we can use the procedure of Smith 1956, which operates similar to the procedure of Rinnooy Kan 1976 . Both procedures aim for having the jobs with the largest cost coe cient i as far as possible at the front of the queue. The Smith-procedure has to take i n to account the due dates, whereas the Rinnooy Kan-procedure has to take i n to account the ready times. For this reason the Smith-procedure starts at the end of the queue, whereas the Rinnooy Kan-procedure starts at the front of the queue. In spite of this di erence it is possible for d-sequencing situations to establish similar relations between optimal orders of various subcoalitions as for r-sequencing situations. However, where in the Rinnooy Kan-procedure these relations are established if a player is added at the end of a subqueue, in the Smith-procedure these relations can be established if a player is added at the front of a subqueue. Following exactly the same line of argument i t c a n b e infered that sequencing games arising from d-sequencing situations are convex games.
In fact, we will show e v en a stronger result: both classes of sequencing situations generate the same class of sequencing games.
Theorem 8 where the rst equality holds sinceŷ is optimal, the second equality b y the definition of 0 ; andx, the third equality and fourth equality b y straightforward calculations. The inequality holds by 11 sincex k = n + 1 ,ŷ k n + 1 , d k = n + 1 , n , r k = r k + 1 and fx i ; :::;x j g = fi; :::; jg. Letx be an optimal solution of 11. By de ningŷ bŷ y k = n + 1 ,x k for all k 2 S we can show in the same way a s a b o ve that vS wS, which completes the rst part of this proof.
Obviously, the second part, DN RN, can be dealt with in an analogous way.
We will prove the result by induction in the size of k;l 0 with 0 k 0 l: W.l.o.g. we will assume q = 1 and 0 i = i for all i 2 N: Notice that with this assumption the position of each job in any order is its completion time.
Let us suppose that l = k + 1 : We distinguish two cases: B e C ; i and e C ; j : In this case player i is in time in the order ; meanwhile player j is not in time. It is trivial to check that c 2 i; j , c 2 i; j = j , i jP ; i j + 2 q , e : Thus, g i;j = j , i jP ; i j + 2 q , e + : Moreover, since C ; i = jP ; i j + 1q e jP ; i j+2q = C ; j it follows that h min n j , i jP ; i j + 2 q , e + ; q j , i oi j , i jP ; i j + 2 q , e + : C C ; i e . In this situation, both players are not in time in the order , then both will still be late when they switch their positions. Then, 
